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                  INTRODUCTION 
  
   
           In the name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Most Merciful 
 
This is an attempt at translating the refutations of the First and Second 
Proofs for the world’s pre-eternity of al-Ghazali’s Tahafut al-Falasafah 
The Incoherence of the Philosophers), page 13 till page 39, Article 6 to 
article 107 as presented in the edition of the same by Marmura1  
The selection of this specific work for a Master’s dissertation was motivated 
by the following criteria: 
• Al-Ghazali is arguably the greatest Islamic thinker after the period of 
the Prophet (saw). 
• The Tahafut has been composed in clear, classical Arabic prose. 
• The enormous impact the Tahafut has had on the subsequent 
development of Islamic thought. 
• The fascinating infusion of logical argument into a domain widely 
regarded as being proper only to religion , and hence affirming the 
contention of the Prophet (saw) that logic was the foundation of his 
religion. 
• The indispensable role al-Ghazali has played in defending the 
fundamental doctrines of Islam via the logical weapons of the 
philosophers themselves, thereby being moved to charge none other 
than ibn Rusd and ibn Sina with Kufr for their heretical views. 
 
    Al-Ghazali’s style is to present the arguments of the Philosophers first and 
then counter them with his own. He then anticipates a possible objection to 
his arguments, presents it and then proceeds to refute it with another rebuttal 
of his own. In this way al-Ghazali proceeds methodically and step by step to 
prove his fundamental assertions. 
    Some of the arguments presented are complex and subtle, and often the 
context and premises are left unstated. Where necessary therefore, proofs 
and refutations have been prefixed by explanatory notes given within curly 
brackets, so as to provide an orientation for the ensuing line of argument. 
Within the translations into Arabic my own interpolations are enclosed in 
                                                 
1 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, edited and translated by Michael E. 
Marmura, Provo, Utah, Brigham Young University Press, 1997. 
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square brackets so as to facilitate continuity and to make explicit hidden 
relations and references among terms. Rarely, some minor passages not 
central to the current theme have been omitted from this translation, lest the 
reader be diverted from the main thread of the proof at hand. While recourse 
has been made to extant translations for guidance, an attempt has been made 
here to keep closer to the original text, and to improve upon the errors and 
omissions of others. Much as I admire and respect al-Ghazali, I was quite 
proud to have detected and pointed out  an error in his text. Meticulous care 
has been taken to keep to the numbering system of the Arabic text adopted 
by Marmura2. The portion of the Tahafut selected for translation has been 
reproduced at the end of this thesis, with the pages numbered in Roman 
numerals for easy reference.My own attempt at translation stands closer to 
that of Marmura rather than to the older translation by Sheik [12]. 
     Fundamentally, al-Ghazali’s reply is that Allah decreed in the eternal past 
that the world should be born at a specific, fixed time in the future. There is 
nothing absurd about a cause having a delayed effect, and if the Philosophers 
opt to disclaim such a possibility simply because it appears irrational to 
them, this is insufficient, for to other minds this explanation seems quite 
rational. 
     The Philosophers argue that since all instances of time are identical, how 
could it have been possible for Allah to single out a single point in time for 
the birth of the world? Al- Ghazali’s reply is that it is the function of the free 
will, even that of Allah’s, to choose and differentiate between two identical 
alternatives. 
     The Philosophers admit to the absurdity of presupposing an unending 
chain of causes for a given phenomena in the world. This is because no 
single link in the chain can provide the quality of unconditional necessity for 
that phenomena. By this is meant that every link in the chain provides only a 
partial justification for the appearance of the phenomena, and any link is 
itself justified by what precedes it in the chain. Hence the chain as a whole 
must lead to an ultimate First Cause, which is necessary “in itself” and 
requires no further justification as a cause. So if the Philosophers are 
prepared to concede such an ultimate cause as the cause for individual 
phenomena in the world, what prevents them from conceding that Allah 
could generate the entire world at a specific, appointed instance in time? 
     The Philosophers believe that any movement, even that of Allah, can only 
be caused by the movement of another mover, and Allah, who is ever 
constant, cannot logically produce such a movement or change in Himself. 
                                                 
2 Ibid 
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They contend that localized, momentary changes in the world are caused by 
the eternal, ceaseless revolutions of the outermost celestial sphere. Its 
revolutions are constant and elliptical, but subject to minor, local variations 
which explain the occurrence of individual phenomena and changes in the 
world. Accidents in the world are thereby attributed to the perpetual orbital 
motions of the spheres and their aberrations, and not to the direct 
intervention of Allah. 
     Al-Ghazali refutes the Philosophers by asking how a temporal movement 
can proceed from an eternal movement. Either both would be eternal, or 
both temporal. And if the temporal movement is due to aberrations in the 
eternal celestial revolutions, what is the cause of such variations in such 
orbital motion? 
     In their Second Proof the Philosophers argue that time is the measure of 
motion. So if they can prove that time is eternal, it would follow that that 
which moves, i.e. the world, is likewise eternal. Al-Ghazali accepts the 
premise that time is the measure of motion. Nonetheless he contends that 
there is no compelling reason to believe that the material world is not finite. 
Hence, time must also be finite.It is only the perverse influence of the 
imagination that leads one to believe that time  exists beyond the realm of 
the physical world. Continuing in this vein, al-Ghazali argues that space is 
finite, because it is simply an  attribute of mass or body, which is something 
finite.  
     The relative merits of the translations by Kamali and Marmura have been 
discussed above, yet it ought also be mentioned that the latter includes a 
critical introduction, placing The Tahafut in its historical and intellectual 
context. Craig [4] in his book The Kalam Cosmological Argument affords a 
technical discourse on the logical problems of the infinite. Providing logical 
and cosmological arguments, his conclusions stand approximate to those of 
The Tahafut. 
Goodman [6] in his article “Ghazali’s Argument from Creation” critically 
analyses al – Ghazali’s so called “contingency argument” which occurs time 
and again in the latter’s writings. The foundation of this argument is that 
Allah is the only self-subsistent being, and that all other beings are 
dependent on Him for existence i.e. the world is contingent. Hourani [7] 
dicusses the debate between al- Ghazali and ibn Rushd. He provides a 
critical commentary on two of the major proofs of the Philosopher’s that had 
been contested by al – Ghazali. In the first proof the debate on the world’s 
pre-eternity and the nature of the Divine Will feature, while in the second 
proof, the question about time being eternal or finite is handled. 
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     Marmura [9] in the extract “the Logical Role of the Argument from Time 
in the Tahafut’s Second Proof for the World’s Pre- Eternity” points out in 
much depth that the structure of the argument of the Philosophers is that of a 
hypothesized, truly disjunctive syllogism, and that the argument is a sound 
one. The Philosophers successfully prove the impossibility of Allah’s 
temporal priority to time. Marmura [10] in his article on “al – Ghazali’s 
attitude to the Secular Sciences” explicitly states al- Ghazali’s postulates 
underlying his refutations of the Philosophers, and the important role the 
Theologian assigned to Logic and Mathematics within Theology. Sheik [12] 
handles the Tahafut in Chapter 9 of his book. He affords a clear, simplified 
exposition of the underlying tenets of the arguments of the Philosophers 
Finally, Watt [13] in his book deals with Theological rather than 
Philosophical issues which had concerned al – Ghazali’, but does provide 
useful biographical material.       
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     SUMMARY 
  
The Philosophers such as ibn-Sina had maintained that time and space were 
co-eternal with Allah, emanating by necessity from His Attributes, and not 
being the results of a deliberate act of creation. This must be the case, for 
otherwise nothing would have been present to induce Him to create the 
world after a period of non-existence. 
Al-Ghazali’s refutation of this is that Allah had decreed in pre-eternity 
that the world would materialize at a future, predetermined date, selecting an 
instance for its birth from a myriad like-instances by exercising His Free 
Will and manifesting therewith a cause with a delayed effect. The 
Philosophers’ explanation of local phenomena as resulting from the 
perpetual motion of the spheres is flawed, since perpetual  celestial motions 
would result in perpetual, not transient phenomena. 
Time, the measure of motion, does not extend beyond the physical 
realm. Time, and hence motion, is finite 
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         KEY TERMS APPEARING IN THIS THESIS 
 
 
 
• Allah 
• Philosophers 
• Argument 
• Birth of the world 
• Eternal 
• Attribute 
• Matter 
• Space 
• Time 
• Logical 
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   THE TRANSLATION 
 
                                               CHAPTER ONE 
 
                                       THE  FIRST  PROOF 
 
Articles 6&7 [p1] 
 
{The Philosophers deny the possibility of the world having 
been created in time by an Eternal Being. For the world to have 
been created at some instant in time and not have co-existed 
with Allah, a giver of preponderance or creator of conditions) 
would have to have given it birth. But where was the giver of 
preponderance before that, and why did it act precisely when it 
did, and not earlier? Allah’s states of being are eternal and 
therefore unchanging; having initially decided not to create the 
world, He could not suddenly have changed His mind and 
willed its creation}. 
 
[The Philosophers] maintain that it is impossible for a temporal 
event to issue from an Eternal Being. [The reason being that] if 
we assume the [presence of] The Eternal with the world not yet 
having issued from Him, then it would indeed not [ever] have 
issued from Him, for the world would not have had that which 
would have given it preponderance. Instead the existence of the  
world would have been possible, but [simply] as pure 
possibility. 
[But] if [on the other hand] it transpired [i.e. the issuance of the 
world from Allah] then [by implication] either a giver of 
preponderance would have emerged or it would not have 
emerged. If no giver of preponderance had arisen, then the 
world would have remained as pure possibility [only] as was 
the prior situation. But if a giver of preponderance did arise, 
then who was the giver of preponderance, and why did [that 
giver] occur [precisely] then and not earlier? So the question 
about the occurrence of the giver of preponderance remains 
[unanswered]. In short, if the states of the Eternal are similar, 
[i.e. unchanging] then either nothing whatsoever exists with 
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Him at all, or else it exists with him eternally. But as for the 
state of refrainment [i.e. non-action] differentiating itself [in 
Allah] from the state of action [in Allah], this is [simply] 
absurd.3 
     
Article8 [p1] 
                     
                    The precise statement of the question of the Philosopher’s [lies 
  in it] being asked why the world did not occur before its actual  
occurrence. It is [of course] not possible that Allah be removed 
from a state of impotency at originating [the world], nor is it 
possible for the world [ever to have been] impossible to create. 
For that would lead [to the conclusion that] The Eternal 
switched from impotency to ability and the world from [the 
state of] impossibility to possibility, whereas [it is well known] 
that both options are unthinkable. 
Nor is there a possibility for it to be said that before the  
creation of the  world there was no purpose [for its creation, 
however] thereafter a purpose was originated. Nor [can there 
be] a possibility of a state [being attained] by a loss of an 
instrument [for creating but] thereafter [being replaced by the 
state of] the instrument being found. Rather, the closest 
imaginable thing to say is that He did not want the existence [of 
the world] before that [i.e. the time of its actual creation]. From 
this it must of necessity be said that its existence transpired 
because He became aspirant for its existence after [the period 
when] He was not aspirant [for it]. In this case an aspiration for 
creation would have [found] occurrence. But the occurrence [of 
an aspiration] in Himself is absurd, since he is not a locus of 
events and the appearance of an aspiration outside himself 
would not [ipso facto] make him an Aspirer.       
                
Article 9 [p2] 
 
                     Let us abandon inquiry into the location of the occurrence of  
the  aspiration [to create the world]. The forms of the [present]     
argument is based upon the source of [the aspiration] for 
creation, from where the aspiration originated, and why it 
                                                 
3 The premise here is that Allah’s states are not receptive to variation 
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occurred now and not earlier. Did it come into existence from 
now from a source other than Allah? If an event is permitted   
[to have occurred] without pre-supposing  a cause,  then let [us 
suppose rather] the world [as a whole] to be an event without a 
maker. And if this is not admitted [as a solution], then [one 
may well ask] what the difference is between the one event and 
the other. For if the world came into being through an action of 
Allah, then why was it born now and not earlier. Was the [prior 
non-existence of the world] due to the lack of an [appropriate] 
instrument, or capability, or purpose or [adequate] nature [of 
the creator]. But when that [absence of the world] was 
exchanged for existence, the world came into being. [But here] 
the format of the argument above recurs.4 Or is [the world’s 
prior non-existence] due to the absence of a will [to create it]? 
[Now if we assume that a will suddenly occurred of itself], 
then that will would have required another will [to create it], 
and in this manner the first will would be conjoined to another 
ad infinitum. 
 
Article 10 [p2] 
 
Therefore, without reservations, [lit. with the unrestricted 
word], it has been verified that the emergence of an event from 
The Eternal , [assuming] no change in the [internal] states of 
The  Eternal as regards capacity, tools or [sufficient] time or 
purpose or [inherent] nature, is [something] unthinkable. The 
assumption of a change [in the internal states of The Eternal] is 
untenable, because the argument for such change in The First 
Mover is no different from arguments for other [changes in the 
internal states of] The First Mover, and all of [these proposed 
changes] are impermissible. So long as the world was present 
and its occurrence [as an event in time] impossible, its infinite 
pre-existence remains not inconceivable. 
 
Article 11[p2]  
 
{This article has been omitted from translation as its contents   
are peripheral to the central theme of the argument} 
                                                 
4 This question being, of course: “What gave rise to the formerly absent instrument, capability, purpose or 
nature?”  
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Article 12 [p2] 
 
{Al-Ghazali now begins his rebuttal of the arguments of the 
Philosophers} 
 
The counter- argument [to that of the Philosophers] derives  
from  two aspects. 
 
 
                      THE FIRST OBJECTION  
 
Article 13 [p3] 
 
One of these aspects is in it being asked of [the Philosophers] 
with what proof they would deny [the argument] of one who 
says that the world actualized through an eternal will that made 
its existence necessary at [precisely] the time that it [in fact] 
materialized. [Further], that the [preceding] absence [of the 
world] lasted until that limit towards which it had proceeded, 
and that existence began precisely when [it had been willed] to 
begin and that existence before that had not been willed. 
[Hence] for [simply] that reason [the world] did not arise 
[previously]. [Rather] at the [specific] time at which it did arise, 
it had been [so] desired by The Eternal Will, and therefore 
materialized. Now, what is the obstruction to this conviction, 
and who is the assignor of the impedance [ to such a ] belief? 
 
Articles 14 & 15 [p3] 
 
{Here al-Ghazali anticipates a possible counter-argument from 
the Philosophers, which he states and later refutes}. 
 
Suppose it is said [by the Philosophers] that this is absurd, and 
its absurdity has been manifested by the [principle that] an 
event is [something] necessitated and caused. And just as it is 
impossible for an event [to occur] without a cause and that 
which makes [its occurrence] unavoidable , it is likewise not 
possible to find an impelling cause , replete with all the 
conditions for optimizing [the effect], and [replete as well] with 
 14
the [knowledge of] the principles [governing] the effect and 
replete with the [knowledge of] its causes to the extent that 
absolutely nothing remains awaited, [but] yet the effect [to be] 
necessitated is delayed. More likely, the presence of the 
necessitated effect at the realization of the impelling cause 
replete with the conditions [for producing] the effect is a 
necessary [consequence]. [Indeed], a delay in the appearance of 
the effect is unthinkable on the grounds of the impossibility of 
the simultaneous presence of a necessitated effect with the 
absence of the [corresponding] impelling cause.5 
 
Article 16 [p3] 
 
For before the existence of the world, the Aspirer existed as 
well as the aspiration, as its nexus. Neither was the object of the 
aspiration, nor the Aspirer renewed. Not even a new nexus 
[between the two], which was not already there, was created. 
This [had to be the case], because all of that [would have 
signified] change [in the Aspirer]. This then [being the case], 
how was the object of aspiration [nevertheless] created, and 
what [was it that] prevented it from having been created before 
that [actual time of creation]. [Indeed], the condition of creation 
did not [even] distinguish itself from the previous condition in 
any thing from [all possible] things, nor in any affair from [all 
possible] affairs, nor in any state from [all possible] states, nor 
[for that matter] in any relation from [all possible] relations. 
More likely, the situation was exactly as it [ever] previously 
was, following which there would not have [possibly] been 
existent the object of aspiration, [the state of affairs, therefore] 
remaining identical to what it was [previously]. But [then 
suddenly] the object of aspiration is present! What is this then 
other than the utmost impossible limit [of absurdity]. 
 
Article 17[p3] 
 
{The Philosophers try to lend plausibility to their standpoint via    
an illustration from everyday life}. 
                                                 
5 There is clearly confusion here in the argument. Correctly the argument should be stated as: “the 
simultaneous presence of an impelling cause with the absence of a corresponding necessitated effect is 
impossible”    
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But this type of absurdity is not [only] restricted [to matters] 
as regards the compelling and the compelled, the necessary and 
the essential. Indeed [it is also illustrated] by the customary and 
the conventional. 
[For example, we see that] if a man were to pronounce divorce 
to his wife, yet [in so doing] does not achieve immediate  
separation, it is hardly imaginable he would achieve it after that. 
This [stems from] his making the pronouncement a pretext for 
[legal] intervention, in accordance with convention and agreed 
practice. Delay of the effect would therefore not be a reasonable 
[outcome], unless the divorce-pronouncement were to be 
annexed to [the condition of taking effect only] the following 
day, or with [the condition of] the entry [the husband] into the 
house. [Obviously only] in such a case [the divorce] does not 
take effect immediately, but instead with the arrival of the 
morrow and with entry [of the husband] into the house. This 
arises from his [the man’s] having made it [the pronouncement] 
a cause connected to an awaited thing. But since [the awaited 
event] is not present at this time, being [as stated] the morrow 
and [the man’s] entry, the attainment of the necessitated [effect] 
has tarried upon arrival of what is not now present. And [to be 
sure], the necessitated effect would not have been achieved 
except [on the condition that] something [else] be already 
realized, that being the entry [of the man] into the house and the 
arrival of the morrow. And even if he [the man] had wanted to 
delay the necessitated effect [normally] arising from a 
pronouncement not made contingent upon the attainment of that 
which is not yet realizable, it [the delay] would have been 
unthinkable, despite his being the stipulator [of the terms of the 
pronouncement], and the arbitrator [lit. selector] of the details 
of the arrangement. Hence if it is not possible for us to stipulate 
this [type of delay simply] by our own desires nor conceive of it 
[occurring], how can we [at all] comprehend [it occurring in the 
realm of] assertions [that are] essential, rational and necessary. 
 
Article 18 [p4] 
 
{Omitted from translation as the argument is vague and only 
peripheral to the central theme} 
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Article 19 [p4] 
 
{Once again an argument by the philosophers is produced, 
eschewing the possibility of any time-lapse between willing and 
that which is willed}. 
 
Now The Eternal Will is subjected to the same rules as our 
[own] resolve. Hence a delay [in the attainment] of the 
objective is unthinkable, except if there is a [stipulated] 
impediment. Nor [for that matter] can the [temporal] priority of 
the objective [to willing] be imagined.6 Hence it is 
inconceivable that an objective [to be arrived at] today should 
materialize [only] tomorrow, unless [as we have seen], this had 
been [prearranged] by virtue of intent. And if The Eternal Will 
were to be subjected to the same laws as our [own] resolve, that 
[i.e. a simple pre-arrangement] would not be sufficient for the 
realization of the [objective of] the resolution [after the pre-
arranged delay]. Rather, there would [in such a case] have to be 
a resurrection of the [original] intention at the [instance of] 
generation [of the intended act]. But this is [nothing other than] 
an assertion of a change in The Eternal. Hereafter there [still] 
remains the identical form [of the previous argument] 
concerning that goal, or aspiration or whatever you wish to be 
its name. [This is]: “Why did it occur now and not previously?” 
So [the end effect is] that either there remains with us an event 
without a cause, or the causes conjoin [regressively] ad 
infinitum. 
 
Article 20 [p5]  
 
{This article has been omitted from translation as it is 
essentially a repetition of the argument given in article 16} 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 For the Philosophers , Allah’s intention and that which He intends necessarily arise simultaneously. 
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Articles 21&22 [p5] 
 
The reply [to the above contention] lies in it being said: [With 
respect to the statement]: “The impossibility of The Eternal 
Will being related to the occurrence of something whatever it 
might be [is confirmed]”- do you know this impossibility 
through the necessary inherent laws of the intellect or through 
[one of] its theories? And [while] according to you, language is 
the domain of logic do you [then] know the connection between 
these two terms by virtue of a middle term or by the absence of 
a middle term? Now if you assert [the presence of] a middle 
term in accordance with the theoretical method, then there is no 
escape from producing it. But if, [on the other hand], you claim 
to know that [connection between the two terms] through the 
impelling [laws of] the intellect i.e., then how is it that your 
detractors do not share with you in this knowledge, [especially] 
as the party convinced of the birth of the world [in time] by [the 
agency of] an Eternal Will may not be contained in a [single] 
land [alone], nor can any number enumerate it. Nor is there any 
doubt that they [i.e. the detractors of the Philosophers] do not 
stubbornly contradict the intellect when they [happen to] posses 
the knowledge of something. It is therefore imperative to 
construct a proof satisfying the rules of logic that demonstrates 
the impossibility of that. [This] all the more so, for in 
everything you have mentioned [thus far] there is nothing 
[more] but the disqualification of contrary arguments and the 
comparison of The Eternal Will with [our own] resolve and 
aspiration. But this comparison is false, for The Eternal Will 
does not correspond with temporally confined intentions. As for 
the simple disqualification [of opposing arguments], this is 
inadequate [as a rebuttal] without a [supporting] proof. 
 
Articles 23 & 24 [p5] 
 
{These two articles have been omitted from translation as they 
deal with Allah’s knowledge of universals, which is a 
digression from our present theme of causality.} 
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Articles 25 & 26 [p6] 
 
{Here al-Ghazali refutes the Philosophers’ notion that the world 
has been existing contemporaneously with Allah for an infinite 
time. He proceeds by invoking the logical paradoxes that 
consistently plague the concept of infinity.} 
 
In fact, we would not be overstepping the unavoidable 
consequences of this inquiry when we ask with what means 
would you [Philosophers] refute your opponents if they said: 
“The eternity of the past is [in itself] an absurdity because it 
induces one to assert an infinite number of revolutions of the 
heavens with no restraint to their units. Nevertheless, 
[paradoxically] they [i.e. the number of revolutions] have 
fractions of a sixth, a fourth and a half. In fact, the orbit of the 
sun revolves [once] in a year, and the orbit of Saturn revolves 
[once] in thirty years so that the [annual] revolution of Saturn is 
a third of a tenth of the [annual] revolution of the sun [in arc 
length]. Further, the [annual] revolution of Jupiter is a half of a 
sixth of the [annual] revolution of the sun [in arc length], for it 
revolves [only once] in twelve years. Again [following from the 
tenets of the Philosophers], just as the number of revolutions of 
Saturn are unlimited, the number of revolutions of the sun are 
[also] without limit. Yet, [paradoxically], the number of 
revolutions [of the Sun] are a third of a tenth of those of  
[Saturn]. Indeed, there is no end to the number of revolutions of 
the orbits of the stars, which revolve once in 76,000 years. 
Likewise, there is no limit to the eastward motion of the sun, 
[occurring] once in a [period of] a day and night. 
And so if someone were to say to the Philosophers: “This is 
from among the things whose absurdity is known by necessity”, 
then with what means would you [Philosophers] dissociate  
yourselves from his words? Moreover, if the speaker were to 
say: “Is the number of revolutions even or odd; or even and odd 
at the same time, or neither even nor odd” and [in reply] you 
were to say [it is] both even and odd simultaneously, or [it is] 
neither even nor odd, then [in this case] the answer’s invalidity 
would be known by [logical] necessity. [But] if [on the other 
hand] you replied “even”, then the even number would become 
 19
odd by [simply the addition of] a single [extra] revolution. So 
how can something with no limit to it lack one [unit]. But if you 
were to say [instead] “odd”, then [of course] we know that the 
odd [number] becomes even with the [mere addition of] a 
[single] unit. Again, how can that [infinite number] lack one 
unit by virtue of which it would become even [were it to be 
added on].7 Again [equally paradoxical, we ask] how can that 
[infinite number] lack one unit by virtue of which it will 
become even. Thus you [Philosophers] are compelled to say 
that the number of revolutions [of the heavenly orbits] is neither 
even nor odd, [an untenable conclusion]. 
  
Articles 27& 28 [p7] 
 
{Here al-Ghazali anticipates and refutes a possible attempt by 
the Philosophers to evade the issue by their declaring any 
question of odd and even numbers as inadmissible} 
 
[Now] if is said by them that indeed it is only finitude [of 
number] that is described as being [either] even or odd, whereas 
that [number] which never ends may not be thus described. [In 
reply], we would say that the invalidity of an aggregate made 
up of units, and possessing the fractions of a sixth and a tenth as 
has been [already] mentioned, yet [at the same time] cannot be 
described as even or odd is known by the necessity of [logical 
truth], without [needing] contemplation. So by what means 
would you find a way out from [this dilemma]. But if it is now 
said [by the Philosophers], that the location of error lies in your 
saying that it [i.e. the aggregate of orbital revolutions] is a 
quantity composed of units. Yet [we all know] that these 
revolutions have vanished. As concerns the past, it is extinct, 
and as concerns the future, it is not yet present. [But] the word 
‘aggregate’ signifies entities [actually] present, [whereas] here 
there is nothing present. [To this], we [Theologians] say: 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 In modern parlance we would affirm al-Ghazali’s  point  by  the statement: infinity + 1 = infinity. It is 
definitely not true that infinity + 1 = an even number. 
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Article 29 [p7] 
 
[Any finite] number may be classified as either even or odd, 
and it cannot possibly escape this [classification]. [This] is 
equally true if what is being counted presently remains or has 
[since] passed away. Hence, if we assume a [certain] number of 
horses, we are compelled to believe that the number does not 
become devoid of being either even or odd, regardless of 
whether we consider the [horses] existing or non-existing. 
Hence, even if they were to vanish after having been present, 
this situation does not differ [as regards their number]. 
 
Article 30 [p7] 
 
{The premise here of the Philosophers, is that the souls of 
departed beings are infinite in number, the world being eternal 
in time. This affords al-Ghazali an example of an infinite 
number whose discrete units are invisible, yet existent. The 
question of whether this number is even or odd remains absurd} 
 
According to your own sources, it is not unthinkable for [there 
to be] entities present, [discrete] units varying in description yet 
infinite [in number]. These are [none other than] the souls of 
human beings that have departed from their bodies. Now these 
are real existent entities [whose number] cannot be described as 
even or odd. So how would you refute one who says that the 
invalidity [of this categorization] is known by [logical] 
necessity, just as you have claimed that the invalidity of the 
relatedness of The Eternal Will to [the willing of] temporal 
events [follows] by [logical] necessity. The opinion on souls 
[used here as a premise] is the one selected by [none other than] 
ibn Sina, and [stems originally] perhaps from the school of 
Aristotle. 
 
Articles 31&32 [p7&p8] 
 
{These have been omitted from translation as they probe deeper 
into the Aristotelian theory of souls, and digress from the 
principal line of thought.} 
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Article 33 [p8]  
 
The point of all this is to make manifest that they have not 
rendered their opponents incapable of their belief in the bond 
between The Eternal Will and temporal events except by the 
claim of necessity. Nor are they able to successfully distance 
themselves from those who [in their turn] claim the [logical] 
necessity [of their conclusions] against them [i.e. the 
Philosophers] in these matters that contradict their conclusions. 
And from this [result] there is no way out. 
 
Article 34 [p8] 
 
{Time, according to the Philosophers, is uncreated and co-
existent with Allah. Here al-Ghazali denies this notion by 
arguing that time, like matter, is created by Allah and that it is 
meaningless to talk of time before the world’s creation.} 
 
And if it is said [by the Philosophers] that this argument 
rebounds against you [Theologians in that] before He created 
the world Allah remained in a state of being able to create for a 
year or two, thereby there being no limit to his capacity. It is as 
if He were patient, did not create, then created. Nor was the 
period of disengagement [in creating] unlimited. Now if you 
[Philosophers] assert that the period of [non-creativity] was 
limited, it follows [logically] that the existence of The Creator 
is bounded as to His beginning.8 But if you said that the period 
[of non-creativity] by Allah was unbounded, then it follows 
[that] a period had elapsed [until actual creation] wherein the 
possibilities [of changes in Allah’s states] would have been 
uncountable. 
 
Article 35& 36  [p8] 
 
{Here al-Ghazali explicitly states the  fundamental axiom upon 
which  his refutations are based.} 
                                                 
8 This conclusion follows only if we adopt the Philosophers’ tenet that Allah and the world exist as entities 
within an infinite, all-embracing time. 
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As far as we are concerned, periods [of time] and time [itself] 
are created entities and we will manifest the truth of our reply to 
this [issue] by distancing ourselves from their second proof [of 
the world’s pre-eternity]. 
 
Articles 37& 38 [p9] 
 
  {Al- Ghazali makes a distinction between the concepts of the 
possible, the impossible, and the necessary: 
Before the generation of the world, its creation hinged upon one of three 
modalities, viz. the possible, the impossible and the necessary. Now it could 
not have been impossible, for the world does indeed exist. Not could it have 
been necessary, for nonexistence of that which is necessary is impoosible to 
be conceived of, and cannot apply to the birth of the world. Hence the only 
remaining plausible alternative is that the world’s creation must always have 
been possible, otherwise it would not have been born when it did. 
But this last modality presupposes a substrate which is in the process of 
becoming actual in form. Possibility cannot subsist in nothingness, but 
presupposes matter as a substratum which is susceptible to possibility . Nor 
for that matter can possibility be posited in Allah, for Allah exists by 
necessity. Hence matter could not have originated in time, for then the 
possibility for its existence would have preceded its existence, which ex 
hypothesi has to be excluded.  
In Kantian fashion, al - Ghazali maintains that possibility, like impossibility, 
is merely conceptual, to which nothing need correspond in actuality. If 
possibility demands a substratum wherein it persists, then so would its 
logical counterpart, termed impossibility. But it is clear that impossibility 
cannot demand a substratum wherein it may persist. Finally, there is a huge 
gulf between the possibility of something’s existence, and its actual 
existence. An illustration would be the ontological fallacy committed when 
one concludes from the statement : “Mermaids swim” that mermaids do 
exist.}  
 
Now suppose the Philosophers were to ask with what means 
would you refute one who relinquished the claim of necessity 
[for their statements], but point to their truth via another aspect. 
This is that the [various points in time] stand at the same level 
as regards receptivity of attachment of The Eternal Will to 
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them.9 So what was it that distinguished a specific point in time 
from [another point in time] before it and after it, while it was 
not inconceivable for the earlier or later times to have been 
chosen for this purpose. 
In fact, as regards whiteness, blackness, motion and rest, they 
[the Theologians] say that whiteness [of an object] results from 
The Eternal Will. The very same spot that is receptive of 
blackness is [equally] receptive of whiteness. So the question as 
to why the Eternal Will bonded with whiteness without bonding 
to blackness remains. And what was it that distinguished one of 
the two possibilities from the other [with respect to] the 
bonding of The Eternal Will with it? [At the same time] 
 we know by [logical] necessity that a thing may not distinguish 
itself from what resembles it except through being designated 
[as such]. 
And if that [principle] is admissible [here], then the occurrence 
of the world is certainly acceptable, for it [the world] is capable 
of existence and equally [capable] of non-existence. It may be 
possibly deemed for the aspect of existence, just as it may be 
possibly deemed for the aspect of non-existence, without [prior] 
designation. And if you [Theologians] said that it is The Eternal 
Will that [eventually] designated it [for existence], then [the 
question arises] about the designation of things by The Eternal 
Will and why it designated [in the manner it did]. But if you 
[Philosophers] now said that ‘why’ is not asked of The Eternal, 
then certainly the world must be assumed as being eternal. Thus 
no one ought to demand a constructor or reason [for the world], 
for [in matters of] the Eternal ‘why’ is not asked.10 
 
Article 39 [p9] 
 
{This article has been omitted, for the analogy herein is vague, 
and better ones are offered later in the text} 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 A misspelling in the Arabic word for ‘will’ occurs here. 
10 The Philosophers argue here that since the viewpoint of the Theologians leads to an inadmissible  ‘why’, 
their position in this matter must be false. 
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Article 40 & 41 [p9 & p10] 
 
[In reply], we would say that, on the contrary, the world was 
created when it was, with the peculiarities with which it was 
created, and in the location where it was created by virtue of the 
will. Now one of the pertinent properties of the will is the 
distinguishing of something from that which is [very] similar to 
it. And if that property were not relevant to the will, then 
sufficiency [for the conditions of creation] would lie [in simply] 
having the power [to do so]. But for the [very] reason that the 
relation of this power to the two opposing [positions] is the 
same, there is no avoiding [the positing of] a designator who 
sets aside something from that which is [very] similar to it. 
Moreover, it is said [by the Theologians] that The Eternal has 
besides this capacity [another] property which among others is 
concerned with earmarking one thing from that which is similar 
to it. Hence the question [previously asked] as to why The 
Eternal Will earmarked one from two similar things is similar 
to the question of the speaker who asks: “Why does knowledge 
[of something] necessarily demand that that thing be 
encompassed [by the knower] regarding those [properties] 
pertaining to it. [The answer to this lies] in saying: “Because 
the word ‘knowledge’ is an expression for a quality [of the 
knower], and this is its [definitive] function.” Nay, the essence 
of this quality [i.e. the will] is the distinguishing of something 
from its likeness. 
 
Articles 42&43 [p10] 
 
And suppose [the Philosophers] were to say that [the attempt at 
the] demonstration of [the presence] of a quality whose function 
is the distinguishing of a thing from its likeness is irrational, in 
fact it is a contradiction. For if the constitution of a thing is 
[very close] similarity [to another thing], this means that they 
cannot be distinguished [from each other], while if its 
constitution is distinction [from anything else], this means that 
it is not similar [to anything at all]. 
For example it is not necessary to think that two black things in 
two different places are identical in every respect. This is 
because this one is in a [particular] place, and that one is in 
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another place. And this [difference] makes distinction 
obligatory. [In the same way] it is not the case that the two 
[similar] black [objects] in the same spot at two different times 
are absolutely identical. This follows from [the fact that] this 
one distinguished itself from that one [with respect to] time. 
Therefore, how can this [black object] be similar to that [one] in 
every respect? When we say that two black [objects] are 
similar, we mean by this expression that they are [similar only] 
in blackness [and thus] connected in a special, not absolute 
way. And if this were not the case, [it would imply] that the 
location and the time [of each object] had become one, there not 
remaining [any] distinguishing features, making [discussion of] 
two black objects, [nay, even] of duality, fundamentally 
irrational. 
This [result] is further realized by the expression ‘The [Eternal] 
Will’ is borrowed from [the concept of] [our own, common] 
will. And nor is it imagined by us to distinguish a thing from its 
likeness by employing [our common] will. Indeed, were there 
before a thirsty man two glasses of water identical in every 
respect to each other, even as regards [the man’s] intention, it 
would not be possible for him to take [any] one of the two [at 
first]. Yet, in fact, he would [at last] choose that which he sees 
as better, or lighter, or nearer to his right hand, assuming it is 
his custom to move his right hand. Or [failing this], any cause 
from this [category of] causes, be it unknown or obvious, 
[could motivate his choice]. And if this is not the case, [then] 
distinguishing something from its likeness in any situation is 
[simply] unthinkable. 
 
Articles 44 & 45 [p11] 
 
The objection [to the thesis of the Philosophers] derives from 
two aspects: 
The first aspect concerns your statement that this 
[distinguishing of a thing from its likeness] is unthinkable. Do 
you [Philosophers] know this thesis through the necessity [of 
logic], or through theoretical speculation [lit. construction]? In 
fact, claiming any one of these [positions] is impossible. Your 
analogy of The Eternal Will [compared] with our [common] 
will is a false comparison, resembling the comparison between 
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[The Eternal Knowledge and our common] knowledge. The 
knowledge possessed by Allah is distinct from our [common] 
knowledge, in matters we have earlier reported on [in the text]. 
So why should the difference between [that which is] eternal 
and [that which is] common [in matters of] the will be 
improbable. Indeed, maintaining this improbability is analogous 
to one who says: “An essence present neither without nor 
within the world, [and] neither attached nor detached [from the 
world] is unthinkable, because we do not conceive it [existing] 
in our reality. Further it is said by the Philosophers: “This 
position of yours is the work of your imagination [only]. As 
concerns the truth of the intellect [for our thesis], well, the 
intellectuals have [already] uttered the confirmation of that 
[thesis].” 
  
{Now al-Ghazali proceeds to refute the Philosophers} 
 
Then with what means would you [Philosophers] refute one 
who says [instead] that the intellect has put forth the 
confirmation of an attribute of Allah, The Exalted, one of 
whose functions is the distinguishing of a thing from its 
likeness. And if the name ‘will’ does not suit [this attribute], 
then it should be named with another name, for there ought to 
be no niggardliness about names. Nevertheless, we have 
applied this name in accordance with the law. [Had this] not 
been the case [we would have refrained from applying it for we 
know that] the word ‘will’ is laid down in the language to 
specify that which has a temporary object of desire. Clearly, 
there is no temporary object of desire with respect to Allah. 
However, what is intended [here] is the meaning [of words], not 
their articulation. 
 
Article 46 [p11] 
 
[And further], against [the thesis of the Philosophers], we do 
not accept that that attribute [discussed above] is unthinkable, 
[even] as regards ourselves. Hence, let us assume that there 
exist two dates identical to each other [lying] before someone 
looking [longingly] at them, but incapable of having both of 
them at once. 
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It is [certainly] not inconceivable that he would [still] take one 
of them by virtue of an attribute whose concern is the setting 
aside of something from that which resembles it. And [with] all 
that you [Philosophers] have mentioned about [lit. from] the 
distinguishing features of goodness or nearness or facility of 
taking we assume [simultaneously] the premise of their being 
absent. Yet, [despite this] there remains the possibility of [his] 
taking [a date]. 
[In short], you [stand] between two matters: Either you may say 
that equivalence with respect to the purpose of the man [having 
to choose one of the two dates] is completely unthinkable, this 
judgement [being mere] stupidity, since the premise [of 
equivalence between the two dates] is [certainly] possible, or 
[on the other hand] you might say that if equivalence [of the 
two dates] has been decreed [permissible], the yearning man 
would forever remain in a state of selecting. [He would be in a 
state of] observing the dates, but never taking either of them by 
virtue of [the instrument of] his will or his preference, [this 
being the consequence of] their having been cut of from [any 
proposed] purpose. But this [option] is also absurd, its 
invalidity being known by [logical] necessity. There is no 
avoiding by any investigator, present or absent, of the 
establishing of the voluntary act, of the confirmation of the 
existence of a quality [associated with such an act], whose 
concern is the distinguishing of something from its likeness. 
 
Articles 47 & 48 [p12] 
 
The second aspect11 of the refutation of the thesis of the 
Philosophers consists in us saying [to the Philosophers] that 
within your own adopted procedure, you have not avoided 
distinguishing something from its [close] likeness. For 
[according to you], the world arose as a result of a cause, 
making its [i.e. the world’s] existence necessary and according 
to special geometrical forms [closely] resembling their 
counterparts [in form]. So [one may well ask] does [the world] 
possess some of these configurations only, when the 
impossibility [here] of distinguishing something from its 
                                                 
11 The first aspect had been introduced in Article 12. 
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likeness in the matter of voluntary or necessitated action does 
not differ by nature [of the matter involved], nor by [logical] 
necessity? 
 
Article 49 & 50 [p12] 
 
Suppose [to this you Philosophers] said that it is not possible 
for the overall order of the world to be [based] upon a design 
other than that upon which it was founded. [And further], had 
the world been smaller or bigger than it is now, the [present] 
order would not have been complete. A similar assessment 
applies to the number of orbits and to the number of stars. You 
assert that something big differs from something small, and that 
things that are many differ from things that are few in number 
with respect to what is required to be fulfilled by them). These 
[categories] are not alike, but differ [from each other], except 
that human capacity is frail as regards attainment [of 
understanding] of the design of the wisdom [of the existence] of 
[different] quantities [of things], and of their [functional] 
details. But still it [i.e. human capacity] perceives the wisdom 
in some of its [i.e. the world’s] designs, as the wisdom in the 
inclination of the orbit of the zodiac from the average [orbit of 
the sun] for a day. [It perceives] wisdom as well in [the 
position] of the apogee and in the orbit that deviates from the 
centre.12  
The majority does not understand the secret [of the wisdom in] 
quantities and details, but it does know differences [among 
quantities and details]. And it is unavoidable that something 
should distinguish itself from what is dissimilar to it by virtue 
of its specific relation to the system of decree.13 But concerning 
[different points in] time, they are utterly alike as regards 
possibility [of creation], and the system [of decree]. Therefore it 
is not possible to maintain that had [the world] been born after 
[the points] in [time] at which it was actually created, or before 
the points [in time] of its creation, by a single moment, the 
[present] system [of decrees] would have been unthinkable. 
                                                 
12 By this is meant elliptical orbits 
13 That is, natural laws and regulations  
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Surely, the [prevailing] equivalence of the states [of creation] is 
known by [logical] necessity. 
 
Articles 51 &52 [p12 & p13] 
 
We [Theologians] say in reply that we could supposedly be 
capable [of challenging] your contention with a matching 
[argument] in the matter of states, as, [for example] in the case 
of speakers saying : “Allah created [the world] at a time which 
was the most suitable for creation”. [Nevertheless], we will not 
limit ourselves to this rebuttal, , but rather insist upon 
[applying] your [own] premises, especially to two cases in 
which it is impossible to assess any disparity. One of these two 
cases is the difference in the direction of the motion [of the 
world], while the other is the specification of the poles14 [of the  
orbit] in the [earth’s] motion around the [celestial] sphere. 
 
Article 53 [p13] 
 
As concerns [the position of] the pole its explanation lies in  
saying that the [orbit of] heaven is spherical, and moves around 
two poles, as if the poles were fixed [points]. The sphere of the 
heaven consists of identical sectors, for it [i.e. the heaven] is 
uncomplicated in structure. [This is true] especially for the 
highest celestial plane, which is the ninth, for it has basically no 
stars. The two celestial spheres [the northern and southern 
hemispheres] rotate around the northern and southern poles. 
Hence we are led to say: There is among the locations [of the 
heavens] no [single] pair of opposite points, these [pairs] being 
infinite in number, except that they could be imagined [as 
comprising] the poles. [In the face of this], why have [what is 
termed] the northern and southern points been singled-out for 
polarity and fixation, and why does the [radial] line of the orbit 
not move [together] with the two [polar] points15, such that the 
poles revert [alternatingly] to the two opposing points upon the 
sphere?16 Thus if we suppose [that there is] wisdom in the scale 
                                                 
14 In modern mathematical terminology these are referred to as ‘foci’. 
15  Dual rendering preferred here, because reference is being made to what we nowadays term the two foci 
of an ellipse 
16  With our present knowledge , we know that the heavenly orbits are elliptical 
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of the expanse and shape of the heavens, what was it that 
determined the location of the poles from any other [possible 
location], to the extent that they were specified to become [in 
reality] the poles to the exclusion of the rest of the sectors and 
points [of the celestial sphere]? Yet [we know that] all the 
points of the sphere are similar to each other, and all the sectors 
of the sphere are equivalent to each other. [Hence] there is no 
escape [for the Philosophers] from this [problem]. 
 
Articles 54 & 55 [p13] 
 
[But now] suppose the Philosophers were to say that perchance 
the location at which lie the points of the poles distinguishes 
itself from other [possible] points by a quality that makes its 
essence appropriate as a position for the pole as a stationary 
[co-ordinate]. [Its essence] is as if it would not abandon its 
place, and realm and location or whatever from the [possible] 
names determined [so as to] be applied to its position. 
[Meanwhile], the remainder of the locations of the celestial 
plane exchange their position with respect to the earth and the 
other celestial planes during revolution, whereas the pole itself 
is fixed as to its location. So perhaps [we might say] that the 
position [of the pole] was superior [in suitability] to being fixed 
in position [as compared] to other positions. 
 
Articles 56 & 57 [p14] 
 
[In opposition to this] we [Theologians] say that in this 
argument [of the Philosophers] there is [an implicit] statement 
of the disparity in nature of sectors of the primary sphere, and 
that equivalence of sectors [of the sphere] does not apply [here]. 
Now this is in contradiction to your [own] premise, as one of 
the tenets upon which you have proceeded [in argument] for the 
necessity of [the cosmos] being spherical in shape, is that the 
[cosmos] is simple in nature and that its equivalent sectors are 
not in disharmony. And [it is known that] the sphere is the 
simplest of shapes. Indeed, the square and the hexagon and 
other shapes besides these two, demand the appearance of 
angles and their inequality [in measure]. Now that cannot come 
about except by an additional requirement upon simple nature. 
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But even if this [present] argument contradicts your own basic 
principles, it does not [by itself] repel that which it is obliged to 
do, for the [earlier] question about that quality still [stands 
unanswered]. This is, precisely [stated]: were the rest of the 
sectors [of the sphere] receptive of this quality [of being the 
repositories of the poles at the time of creation] or not? 
Should one say ‘yes’, then [the question is] why this quality 
devoted itself exclusively to only some among equivalent 
[locations, and not others]? And should they [in reply] say that 
that quality [to which you have referred] does not belong 
[anywhere else] except in that location, while the rest of the 
sectors cannot receive it, then we [Theologians] would say [the 
following in reply]: “The rest of the sectors by virtue of their 
constituting a body receptive of the [possible] shapes of things, 
are equivalent [in this respect] by necessity. And that [present] 
position [of the poles] does not have a claim to that special 
quality [of being the repository of the poles] merely by being a 
body or merely by being a celestial plane. This [is a 
consequence of] this connotation [of ‘location’] being shared by 
all the sectors of the celestial sphere. Hence the inescapable 
conclusion is that the location’s distinction [in that it possesses 
the poles] is a result of [arbitrary] decree, or [even better, a 
result of the action] of a quality whose concern is [none other 
than] the distinguishing of something from its likeness.  
And if [this argument does not suffice], then just as it is correct 
for them to say that the [different] states of the world are 
equivalent as regards [disposition for] instantiation of the world 
in them, it is [equally] correct for their antagonists [to say] that 
the [various] sectors of the cosmos are equivalent as regards 
reception of the intention by virtue of which fixity of the 
location [of the poles] became more seeming [to them] than  
[continual] alternation of location. And there is no evading this 
conclusion. 
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Article 58 [p14] 
 
The second necessary conclusion pertains to [the question of] 
some of the orbital motions being from the east to the west, but 
some [others] being in the opposite [direction] whereas [we 
know] that the directions [in relation to the complete 
configuration of the heaven] are equivalent.17 So what is the 
cause of this [difference in rotational direction] when 
equivalence of direction like equivalence of times are without 
[noticeable] discrepancies?  
 
Articles 59 & 60 [p14 & p15]  
 
And [what if] they [the Philosophers now] should say [in 
defense] that if all [the celestial spheres] were to revolve in one 
direction [only], then their [respective] positions would not 
have been evident, and the correlation of the stars with respect 
to triangularity and hexagonality and [such] relations, and other 
[geometrical aspects] would not occur. Rather, the whole 
system would [always] be in one [single] state that would not 
ever diverge. On the other hand, these [geometrical] 
relationships are the foundations of the phenomena of the 
world. 
 
Articles 61 & 62 [p15]  
 
We [Theologians] say [in reply to the above] that we are not 
obliged [to accept] the absence of divergence in the direction of 
motion [as you maintain]. On the contrary, we say that the 
highest celestial sphere [vertically speaking] , revolves from 
East to West, and the one [immediately] below it in the 
opposite direction. [But], at the same time, every [objective] 
that could possibly be attained by [this configuration], could 
possibly be attained by a contrary [configuration], namely, by 
the highest orbit revolving from West to East. That which is 
immediately under it, would [now] move in the opposite  
[direction] to it, thereby attaining [the required] differentiation 
                                                 
17 In other words, what significance is there in, for example, one planet revolving around the sun anti-
clockwise, and another revolving clockwise? 
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[in geometrical relations]. Now, conceding the motion as being 
circular and [mutually] opposite in direction, the directions of 
motion are equivalent [to each other with respect to the overall  
spatial arrangement.] Hence the question [remains], why was  
the one direction favoured in relation to its equivalent 
[opposite] direction? 
 
Articles 63 & 64 [p15] 
 
[But] suppose that they [now] said that the two directions 
mentioned by [the Philosophers] are mutually opposite and  
contradictory, so how could they be [at the same time] 
equivalent? [Our reply would be that they ask this question], yet 
claiming to know equivalence in time with respect to the 
possibility of the birth of the world and with respect to every 
relevant event whose necessity must be imagined for the birth 
[and burgeoning of the world]. In similar fashion, equivalence 
with respect to receptivity of motion, of ranges of [motion], of 
situations, of locations, of directions and every other relevant 
matter connected [with the like] are known [and accepted by the 
Philosophers despite the occurrence of oppositeness in 
directions]. So if the claim of [inadmissible] differences [in 
configuration] is permitted to them despite all these 
[resemblances] disparity [in analogous] situations and 
configurations ought to be permitted to their antagonists. 
 
 
                THE SECOND OBJECTION 
 
{The First Objection had been initiated in article 23} 
 
The second  [fundamental method] of counterargument against 
the foundation of their [i.e. the Philosophers] proof lies in it 
being said that you [Philosophers] regard as far-fetched the 
emergence of [a temporal] event from an eternal [cause], 
whereas, [in fact], you are obliged to recognize its possibility. 
Indeed, in the world there are events for which there are causes. 
For if [worldly] events are based upon [previous worldly] 
events without [ever] reaching a limit, this would be 
[something] unthinkable, for this is not the doctrine of an 
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intelligent man. For were that a possibility, you would certainly 
have dispensed with recognizing the The Maker, and dispensed 
[with] the conviction of a necessary, existent Being who is the 
cause of [all] possibilities. Assuming [now] that [the chain of] 
all occurrences [in the world] has a limit, then the chain [of 
events] would end with that limit. That limit is [none other 
than] The Maker. Therefore, based upon their own tenets, there 
is no way out from sanctioning the emergence of an event from 
an eternal [cause]. 
 
Articles 67 & 68 [p16] 
 
What if [the Philosophers should] then say that they do not hold 
unlikely that an event [in time] can issue forth from an eternal 
cause, whatever that event may be? Rather [they continue, our 
precise objection is that] we consider remote the issuing forth 
of the [very] first event from The Eternal. This [position] is true 
because  as regards the preponderance tending toward existence 
[of the world], the actual state of the [very] first event did not 
differ from [the state] that preceded it. [This statement] applies 
equally with respect to the arrival of [an appointed] time, [the 
availability of] an instrument, [the fulfillment of] a requirement, 
[the presence of] a natural order, of a purpose or cause among 
[possible] causes. Now in the case where indeed we are [not 
dealing with] the [very] first event, it is permitted [logically 
speaking]  for [any] event to issue forth [simultaneously] with 
some condition [or other] from The Eternal. [These could 
possibly be] from among [conditions such as] preparedness of 
the place of reception [for the event], the arrival of the 
appropriate time, or whatever [else might be required] to set in 
motion this [specific] chain [of events]. 
 
 
Articles 69 & 70 [p16] 
 
To this [argument] we [Theologians] would say, that the 
question about the attainment of preparedness, the arrival of the 
[right] time, and everything [else] that was revitalized [for the 
purpose at hand] still remains: Either [the events] form a series 
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without a limit, or they terminate at an eternal cause from which 
issued the [very] first event. 
 
Articles 71  & 72 [p16] 
 
Suppose that the [Philosophers] said [now] that matter that is 
receptive of forms, accidents and states are not things from 
which events proceed. [Rather], the conditions for an event 
[occurring] are orbital motions [of celestial bodies.] [By this] is 
meant the circular motion and what is generated by it [in terms 
of qualities] from among all [possible] additional qualities [of 
things]. [These may be, for example, from the qualities of] 
triangularity, hexagonality and rectangularity.These are 
[simply] interrelations among some sectors of the heavens and 
stars. Some of these are relations [established] with the earth. 
Some of these relations are attained with the ascent [of the sun] 
at sunrise, [others] with sunset, others are established by the 
decline [of the sun] from the utmost limit in altitude and 
distance from the earth when the stars are at their apogee. 
[Another] relation is obtained by the sun being at its perigee, 
and its inclination being away from some countries [lying] in 
the northern or southern [hemispheres]. 
And this supplementation [in geometrical relations] is 
necessarily [a compulsory one], for it is coerced by the circular 
motion itself. As concerns the events that are contained in the 
curve of the orbit of the moon, [the word ‘events’ here referring 
to what] are the [essential] ingredients of that which occurs 
within it concerning [matters such as] birth and decay, union 
and separation, and transition from one quality to another [of 
the celestial bodies]: all of these are events linked to each other 
in complex [lit. lengthy] detail and at the end [of it all], the root 
of their causes ends with the circular celestial movement, the 
relative [positions] of the stars to each other, and their relative 
[positions] with  respect to the earth. 
 
Article 73 [p17] 
 
From all that was [just mentioned], it results [in the conclusion 
that] the eternal, perpetual, circular motion is the cause of all 
the events [in the world]. And the spirits of the heavens, are the 
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dynamo of the circular motion of the heavens. [Certainly] these 
spirits live, descending, [to the spheres even] as our [once 
heavenly] spirits descend in relation to our bodies to the rank of 
our [present] souls. The spirits of the heavens are eternal. 
Surely [therefore], the circular eternal motions which are a 
necessary [effect] of the [heavenly] spirits are likewise eternal. 
And because the states of the souls are equivalent [to each 
other], owing to their being eternal, the states of the [circular 
motions] are equivalent; in other words, they [i.e. the motions] 
were always circular. 
 
Article 74 [p17] 
 
It is therefore unthinkable that an event would issue forth from 
an eternal cause, except via an eternal, circular motion that in 
one aspect is similar to The Eternal, as He [Himself] is eternal 
and perpetual, but in [another] aspect resembles any [other] 
event, because every [constituent] facet presumed of it is itself a 
[realized] event after [the period when] it had not [yet] been 
manifested. Hence, from the aspect that the [circular 
movement] is an event as regards its constituent parts,  
[including any] qualities complementary [to it], it is a 
fundament to [all ensuing] events, and from [the other] eternal 
aspect [ which is comprised of] equivalent, [unchanging] states, 
[it is deemed to] issue forth from an eternal spirit. Hence if 
there are events [occurring] in the world, there must 
[necessarily] also be  circular motion [in the sense referred to 
earlier]. But [as we know] there are events [occurring] in the 
world. Therefore, the [existence] of the eternal, circular motion 
is confirmed.18  
 
Articles 75 & 76 [p17]   
 
In reply we [Theologians] say that this long-windedness does 
not become you [at all]. [For we may well ask] whether the 
circular movement [of the spheres] which [as you claim] is the 
fundament of [all worldly events] is itself an event or 
                                                 
18 The falsity of this argument of the Philosophers is apparent: If A implies B, it does not necessarily follow 
that B implies A.  
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something) eternal. Hence, assuming it is eternal, how did it 
become a stating point for the [very] first worldly event? But if, 
[on the other hand], it were itself [merely] a worldly event, it 
would have needed another event [as a cause for its appearance, 
thus] forming a chain [without end]. 
[We turn now to your] assertion that it [the eternal circular 
motion] is in one aspect similar to The Eternal, while in another 
aspect it is like any [other] temporal event. This follows 
[according to you] from it being something constantly renewed, 
i.e. it is unchanging in its renewal, a created thing of constancy. 
[To this] we [Theologians] ask if [the circular motion] is a 
starting point for temporal events by virtue of it being constant, 
or [in contrast], by virtue of it being something renewed? 
[Now if it were a starting point] from the aspect of it being 
constant, then how did something [existing] at times but not at 
other times emerge from something unchanging and similar in 
its states? But if [the circular motion is a starting point] by 
virtue of it being [something] renewed, then what is the 
intrinsic cause of its renewal? [The proposed cause] would 
require another cause, forming an [infinite] chain. The [chain] 
would be the end result of repetition [of what are now induced] 
compulsory [causes]. 
 
Article 77 [p18] 
 
                    {This has been omitted because it deals largely with peripheral         
remarks}. 
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   CHAPTER  TWO 
 
A second type of proof that they [ i.e. the Philosophers] have for this 
question [presently being debated]. 
 
  First discussion. Second proof. 
 
Articles 78 & 79 [p18] 
 
They [i.e. the Philosophers] maintain that a speaker [who says] 
that the world is posterior to Allah and that Allah is prior to the 
world is not alone [in his standpoint]. For he [i.e. the speaker] 
may [well] intend [by this] that Allah is prior [to the world] by 
nature, not temporally [prior], just as [by analogy], one is prior 
to two, which is in accordance with nature. Nonetheless, [the 
number] one may possibly accompany [the number] two in 
[terms of] existence and time. [In a] similar [sense] is the 
priority of cause to effect, and the priority of the motion of a 
person and the motion of his shadow that follows him, 
understood. [Analogous as well] is the [case of] the priority of 
motion of the hand to that of the ring [on one of its fingers], and 
the priority of the motion of the hand in water to that of the 
[motion of] the water. [For all] these [events] are equal to each 
other as regards time19, [even] though some of them are causes 
and some of them are effects. Therefore, it is said that the 
shadow moved because of the movement of the person, and the 
water moved because of the movement of the hand in the water. 
Conversely, it is not said that the person moved by virtue of the 
movement of the shadow, nor that the hand moved by the 
instrument of the movement of the water, even though [the 
members of each related couple] are equivalent [to each other] 
in time [of occurrence]. Thus, if by the precedence of the 
Creator with respect to the world, this [connotation of the term] 
is intended, the necessary conclusion is that both [Allah and the 
world] are temporal events or both are eternal. Furthermore, it 
is not possible for one of them to be eternal in time, while the 
other is an event restricted in time. 
                                                 
19 i.e. they occur simultaneously  
 39
Article 80 [p19] 
 
But if it is meant [by the term under discussion] that The Maker 
is precedent to the world not intrinsically by His [very] essence, 
but [simply] with respect to time, then it follows that before the 
birth of the world and of time [as we understand it] there was a 
primeval time during which the world was not in existence. 
[This conclusion] proceeds from [the fact that] non-existence 
antecedes existence. Moreover [we conclude that] Allah would 
have preceded [the world] in time by a [very] extended interval. 
This interval would have had a boundary in the sense of its 
ending, but no boundary in the sense of its beginning. [The 
final] conclusion would be that before [common] time there 
was an [extraordinary] time which had no end to it. But this 
conclusion is incompatible [with what went before]. By virtue 
of this contradiction, speaking of time as a created event is 
unthinkable. Hence, if the eternity of time is a necessary 
conclusion, the eternity of motion is [likewise] a necessary 
conclusion, for time is an expression of the extent of motion.20 
Moreover, the existence of the generator of motion is also made 
necessary, as it is that which, by the continuity of its motion, 
perpetuates time. 
 
Articles 81 till 89 [p19 - p21] 
 
{These have been omitted from translation for al - Ghazali 
simply elaborates on the foregoing by citing more examples} 
 
Article 90[p22] 
 
But as concerns [on the one hand] the non-existence that 
preceded the world, and [on the other hand] the primary 
boundary of essential existence, [these two limits] would not be 
conceived of being interchanged so that [the first part] becomes 
the last. Nor can the non-existence surmised at the final 
annihilation of the world, which [logically] is a non-existence 
that follows, be conceived as becoming the preceding non-
existence. These two extremities [represent] the limits of the 
                                                 
20 This is a fundamental tenet of the Philosophers 
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existence of the world, the one being first and the other being 
second. [These two extremities] are essential and established, 
and interchanging them via a change in relationship [to us] is 
definitely unthinkable. Now this [situation] is different from the 
[case of] “above” and “below”. We therefore can possibly say 
that the world has neither an “above” nor a “below”, but we 
cannot say regarding the coming into being of the world that 
there is neither a “prior” [time] nor a “posterior” [time]. Nor is 
it possible for you [Theologians] to say that the world’s coming 
into existence has neither a “prior” [time] nor a “posterior” 
[time]. So the “prior” [time] and the “posterior” [time, relating 
to the world’s existence] have been [duly] confirmed; and there 
is no [further] meaning to time intervals except that which is 
[normally] expressed by [the terms] “prior” and “posterior”.  
 
Articles 91 & 92 [p22 & p23] 
 
In reply, we [Theologians] say that this [argument] makes no 
difference [to the truth of our position]. [We say] this because 
for there is [in reality] no [definite] object of intention in the 
intimation [associated with] the expressions ‘above’ and 
‘below’. Nevertheless, [we will] deviate [from our original 
intentions] and [adopt the use of] the expressions ‘beyond’ and 
‘outside’. We say that the world has ‘within’ and a ‘beyond’. 
Hence [we ask] whether beyond the world there is something 
which is either filled or empty. [The Philosophers] would say 
[in reply] that there is nothing which is empty or full. But if you 
intend by [the term] ‘beyond’ the uppermost surface [of the 
celestial sphere], then the term ‘beyond’ may be applied to it. 
But if you intended anything else [in using this term], then [we 
submit] that there is no [realm] beyond the world.  
In like fashion, if the question of whether the birth of the world 
has a period prior [to it] is posed to us, we would reply [as 
follows]: “what is intended by this question is [in fact] whether 
the birth of the world has a beginning that [may be designated 
as] an outermost point whence it had its inception? Should [this 
be the case], then [we admit] that in this respect the world has a 
‘prior’ [time]. [For] this is analogous to the world having a 
yonder [region]. [Our conception is founded] upon the 
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interpretation that this region is roofless, remote and external 
[to the world]. 
But if, [on the other hand, by the term] ‘prior’ [time] you mean 
something else, then [know that] there is no prior time in 
relation to the world. [For] this is analogous to intending [by 
the term] ‘beyond the world’ something other than its 
[enveloping] surface. [In this event] it would [be said] that there 
is nothing exterior to the world. Now if you Philosophers 
should say that a beginning [instant] of birth with [absolutely] 
no [time-interval] prior to it is an irrational [proposition], it 
would be said in rebuttal that the [physical] boundedness of the  
presence of a body with no exterior to it is [equally] absurd. 
And [finally] if you [Philosophers] were to say that the exterior 
of such a [bounded] body is its [outermost] surface, which is 
simply a discontinuation [of that body] and nothing more, we 
would say [in reply] that the prior time-period [of the world] 
was the inception of its coming into being, this being its 
outermost [temporal] boundary, nothing more.” 
 
Article 93 & 94 [p23] 
 
It remains for us [Theologians] to say that Allah has [a type of] 
existence which is not [shared] by the world. And this [most 
elevated] rank [of existence] does not entail establishing [the 
existence] of anything else. And that which indicates that [i.e. 
the truth of the assertion of another existence besides Allah] is 
[none other than] the activity of the imagination which is 
specially [related] to [matters of] time and space.  
And certainly the opposition, even if they were to be convinced 
of the eternity of body, [yet] their imagination succumbs to 
surmising that it [i.e. that body] came into being [as an event in 
time]. [On the hand] though we [Theologians] might believe in 
its birth [as an event], our imagination would perhaps succumb 
to surmising that it were eternal – this [observation applies] 
with respect to body. 
But if we were to return to the [question of] time, the opposition 
is incapable of hypothesizing the birth of a time-span which is 
[not itself] preceded by some [previous] time-span. Now [we 
submit] it is possible to pose [an idea] as a hypothesis within 
the imagination [that is] contrary to one’s belief. However, this 
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idea [about the birth of time] is among those [ideas] that cannot 
be posed within the imagination, and the same applies to the 
[idea of] space. Indeed, [both] one who affirms the bounded 
ness of body, and one who doubts it, are incapable of surmising 
[the existence of] a body beyond which there is neither empty 
space nor occupied space . Their imaginations [simply] will not 
yield to accepting this idea. 
Nevertheless, it is said that if a clear mind does not reject the 
existence of a bounded body, this [position being adopted] on 
the strength of proof, then one should not incline towards [the 
prodding] of the imagination. In like manner, a clear mind does 
not reject [the idea of] the inception of an existence [of 
something which had been] preceded by absolute nothingness. 
And should the imagination fall short [in conceiving] this, do 
not [simply for this reason] incline towards [its urgings and 
thereby ignore the voice of reason]. [After all], this [inadequacy 
of the imagination is a consequence of] the imagination not as 
yet having acquaintance itself with a bounded body except that 
besides it is [always either] another body or air conceived as 
empty space. [It is] for [this reason] that it [i.e. the imagination] 
is unable in abstentia to conceive of that [sort of birth]. In like 
manner, the imagination is not conversant with an event, except 
that it [i.e. the event] has followed something else. Hence, it 
shies away from hypothesizing about an occurrence having [no 
prior time-interval preceding it], and [in particular when] this 
occurrence [results in] an existing thing that has been 
completed. 
 
Article 95 [p24] 
 
This then is the cause of the error[in the argument of the 
Philosophers]. All resistance [to them] crystallizes with this 
objection.  
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     Their [i.e. The Philosophers] second form [of proof] for the       
                             necessity of time’s eternity. 
  
Articles 96 & 97 [p24] 
 
They [the Theologians] say that there is no doubt therein [i.e. in 
the belief] that according to us, Allah was capable of creating 
the world before He [actually] created it. [The] scale of this 
time [could well be] a year, a hundred years, or [even] a 
thousand years. Indeed, these estimates are [quite] different 
[from each other, both] in scale and magnitude. Therefore, there 
is no avoiding confirmation [of the presence] of something 
before the coming into being of the world. [This something] 
was extended and has been assessed [as to its size]. Some parts 
of this something are estimated to be more expansive and 
longer than other parts. And if you [Theologians] then should 
say to us that it is not possible to apply the expression ‘years’ 
except after the birth of the heavens and their [attendant] 
revolutions, we [Philosophers] will quit [using] the expression 
‘years’, and [instead] furnish a different wording and say the 
following: “Assuming that the heavens of the world since its 
initial coming into being have already revolved , for example, a 
thousand revolutions [till now], would Allah have been capable 
of creating  before [this present] world a second one like it? [As 
an additional condition, this hypothesized second world ought 
to have been] such that it would have terminated [its 
revolutions having arrived] at the present time with a thousand 
one hundred revolutions. 
Should you [Theologians] say ‘no’ [to this proposition], it 
would be as if The Eternal had reverted  from [a state of] 
incapacity to [a state of] potency, or [alternatively it would be 
as if] the [second , hypothesized] world had reverted from being 
impossible [to create] to being possible [to create]. But should 
you [Theologians] say ‘yes’ [to this proposition], and this is 
unavoidable, then [we ask], was Allah capable of creating a 
third world such that it terminates [in its revolutions, having 
completed] at the present time a [total of] a thousand  two 
hundred revolutions? 
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Again, there is no way out but to say ‘yes’. Hence, we would 
[then] ask  whether the world which, according to the system of 
our postulates we would call ‘the third [world]’, despite it being 
the most recent, could possibly have been created 
[simultaneously] with the world we have [already] named ‘the 
second world’? This [‘third world’] would then [eventually] 
have reached us,21 terminating with a thousand  one hundred 
revolutions. [In so doing], both [‘second’ and ‘third’] worlds 
would be equivalent with respect to the [orbital] distance 
[covered, even] with respect to motion and velocity. But 
[should] you [Theologians] say ‘yes’ to this [conclusion], then 
this [answer] would be absurd. [This] is indeed [so], as it is 
impossible for two motions to be equal in rapidity and slowness 
, and [even though] the number of their revolutions differ, yet 
[they] arrive at termination [of their revolutions] at the same 
time. And [in defense] you might say that the ‘third world’ 
which terminates [in its revolutions] at our present time with [a 
total of] a thousand two hundred revolutions, could not 
[possibly] have been created [simultaneously] with the ‘second 
world’ which terminates [in its revolutions] at our [present] 
time with a [total of] a thousand one hundred revolutions. You 
[Theologians] might say [in addition] that instead it is 
unavoidable that Allah created it before the ‘first world’ by an 
extent [in time] that equals the extent [in time] whereby the 
‘second world’ preceded the ‘first world’. 
We have called this [world] ‘The first [world]’ because of [its 
quality of] being more in affinity with our imagination. It is the 
‘first world’s’ [beginning] that we project back from our 
present time in our hypothesis. Hence we conclude the time-
span of our present world to be double [in extent] to the time-
span of [any] other possible-world. Thus it is unavoidable [that 
we conclude] that one possible-world’s time be double that of 
all [other possible-worlds taken together.] Now these virtual, 
measured possible time-spans, some of which are longer than 
others by a knowable amount, could have no reality except that 
of [actual] periods of time.” 
 
 
                                                 
21 i.e. our present epoch 
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Article 98 [p25] 
 
“But these [temporal] quantities [used in our hypothesis] are not 
attributes of the essence of The Creator, exalted be He above 
our speculation. Nor are these [quantities] attributes of the non-
existence of the world. Indeed, non-existence is not something 
to be determined by different scales [of measurement]. 
Nonetheless, quantity is an attribute, and [as such], it 
necessitates a possessor [of the attribute of] quantity. And that 
[something] is nothing except motion while quantity [in the 
sense used here is nothing] but time. [Time, in turn] is [simply] 
the measure of the extent) of motion.22 Therefore, by your [i.e 
the Theologians] own [postulates], there was prior to the 
[actual] world something which possessed differing quantities, 
and this is time. Hence by your own [axioms], before the [birth 
of the world] there existed an [actual] time-span. 
 
Articles 99 & 100 [p25] 
 
The rebuttal to this argument of the Philosophers is [to say] that 
all this is the work of the imagination. The shortest method to 
repel it is [to undertake] the comparison of time with space. 
Indeed, we [Theologians] ask whether it was within the 
capacity of Allah to create the roof of the uppermost heaven 
thicker than the one he [actually] did by a cubit. Should [the 
Philosophers] reply with ‘no’, this [implies] incapacity [on His 
part]. Should they reply with ‘yes’, then this [implies that He 
could have created the roof thicker] by two cubits, or three 
cubits, [thereby]  proceeding in like fashion without end. In this 
process, there is the [implicit] confirmation of a dimension 
beyond the world. This dimension has both extent and quantity. 
Indeed, that which is greater in thickness [than the celestial 
roof] by two cubits would not fill-up spatially [that very same 
volume] which something greater in thickness by [only] one  
cubit would  fill-up. By this criterion, beyond [the confines] of 
the world there is [the attribute of] quantity, and [this attribute] 
calls for that which possesses quantity. These entities are [none 
other than] body and space. Therefore, [we have shown that] 
                                                 
22 al-Ghazali does not contest this fundamental tenet of the Philosophers. 
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beyond the world there is either empty [space] or filled [space], 
so what is the reply [of the Philosophers] to this conclusion? 
In like fashion, we may ask if Allah is capable of creating the 
sphere of the Earth smaller than that which He actually created? 
[And if so], could this [reduction] have been [of the order of] a 
cubit, or even two [cubits]? In addition, [considering both 
paradigms], is there not between these two scenarios,23 a 
difference in that [dimension] which recedes in [extent of] 
fullness and occupancy [of space.]? In fact, the [extent of] 
fullness that recedes by the reduction [in thickness of the 
celestial roof] of two cubits is greater than that [corresponding 
extent] which recedes with a reduction [in thickness of the 
celestial roof] of [only] a cubit. [This] result [indicates] that 
space is [an entity capable of being] measured. But, [as we have 
seen before], nothingness is not a [substantial thing], so how 
could it be a measured [quantity]?24  
Our answer [therefore] to the flights of the imagination wherein 
[it] proposes the [existential] possibilities of time-spans before 
the birth of the world is akin to your [i.e. Philosophers’] 
answer to the flights of the imagination wherein [it] proposes 
the [existential] possibilities of [actual space] beyond [the 
confines] of the world. There is no difference [between the two 
answers].25 
 
Articles 101 & 102 [p26] 
 
But the Philosophers might say that they do not claim  that 
which is not possible is [nevertheless] decreed by [Allah]. And 
the world’s being bigger [in size] than it [actually] is, and not 
smaller than that [hypothesized, inflated size] is [logically] not 
possible. Hence, [it is for this reason], that it was not decreed26. 
 
 
                                                 
23 The first scenario appears in the paragraph immediately preceding this one. 
24 The quite different concepts of ‘the void’ or ‘empty space’ and ‘absolute nothingness’ must be carefully 
distinguished at this point 
25 Space exists only as the possibility of the extention of matter. So where no matter can possibly exist as, 
for example, beyond the limits of the world, no space can be present. This tenet underpins al-Ghazali’s 
rebuttal.  
26 A fundamental postulate of al – Ghazali is that what is not logical is not ever decreed by Allah.  
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Article 103 [p26] 
 
This explanation27 is false in three aspects. 
 
Article 104 [p27] 
 
One of these [aspects] is that it is [a reflection of] stubbornness 
of mind. For indeed the mind, to the proposition of the world 
being larger or smaller than it [actually is ] by a cubit, does not 
react as [it does] to the [proposition of] the unity of black and 
white; or [to the proposition of] the unity of existence and non-
existence. That which is [completely] forbidden [by the mind] 
is unifying the negation [of something] with its affirmation. All 
absurdities have their origins in this [error]. This explanation 
[of the Philosophers] is therefore arbitrary, weak and false. 
 
Article 105 [p26] 
 
The second aspect [of the falsity of their explanation] is that if 
the [magnitude] of the world cannot possibly be greater or 
smaller it than [actually] is, then its present magnitude is 
[something] necessary [and] not something [merely] possible. 
But that which is necessary is independent of [any] cause.[In 
that case], [you should rather] say what the atheists say as 
regards denial of The Maker and denial of The Cause that is the 
cause of all causes. But [as is known], this is not your tenet. 
 
Article 106 [p27] 
 
The third aspect [of the falsity of their explanation] is that the 
[aspiring] repudiator of this false explanation is not incapable of 
opposing it with a similar [argument]. Therefore, we [of the 
opposition] may say [in like fashion] that the world could not 
possibly have come into being before it actually did, but 
[rather] that its birth coincided with [the moment of] possibility 
[of its birth].This explanation [of ours requires] no further 
classification of details. But you [Philosophers] may say [in 
rebuttal] that The Eternal [in this case] reverted from capability 
                                                 
27  Lit. ‘excuse’ 
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to incapacity.28 In reply, we would say ‘no’, for the existence 
[of the world] had not been [previously] possible, and therefore 
had not been decreed [for existence]. [Moreover], abstention 
[on His part], from realizing that which is not possible does not 
imply incapacity [in Him]. And if you [Philosophers] should 
ask how the [birth of the world] could have been [at first] 
forbidden, but then became possible, we would ask [in reply] 
why [its birth] could not be forbidden under [certain] 
circumstances, and possible [in other circumstances]. The 
[Philosophers] may say that the circumstances [were always] 
the same, but [to this the following] would be said [in reply]; 
“Extent [in all directions of space] is the same, so how could a 
[specific] measured [distance] be possible while a distance 
greater or smaller than it by the scale of a fingernail is 
prohibited. So if [by your own admission] that [latter scenario] 
is not impossible, it is [likewise] not impossible [for the birth of 
the world to have been once prohibited, but then later possible]. 
29 This then is the method of countering [the explanation of the 
Philosophers]. 
 
Article 107[p27] 
 
In replying [to the Philosophers], that which has to be 
confirmed is that whatever was mentioned in their proposed 
possibilities [as regards the world’s creation]30 is meaningless. 
What is [in fact] indisputable is that Allah, The Exalted, is 
Eternal and Capable of anything [He wills]. If He wills 
something, no action [whatsoever] is ever impossible for Him. 
In this [counter-] proposal [of His unrestricted will] there is 
nothing that essentially requires the affirmation of an 
[infinitely] prolonged time-span. [And this requirement would 
not materialize] unless the imagination adds something else [to 
befuddle our perceptions] through its deceptive [influence]. 
 
                      
                                                 
28 A logical error appears here in the Arabic original. The correct rendering should be: “from incapability to 
capacity”.  
29 Space and time being isotropic, al-Ghazali applies those premises and results about space and time 
accepted by the Philosophers  to prove his thesis of the possibility of the temporal creation of the world.   
30 Or non-creation 
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  CHAPTER THREE 
 
                                Epilogue 
 
In support of al-Ghazali’s refutation of the theses of the 
Philosophers are the modern findings of Physics. Scientists are 
unanimous that the entire universe began with a single ‘Big 
Bang’, and have even been able to calculate when this cosmic 
explosion occurred. “… the universe began about 18 billion 
years ago in a primordial, cataclysmic event”.31 The ‘Big- 
Bang’ Theory, founded upon empirical observation of a 
constantly expanding universe, requires the creation of the 
universe from a condition of infinite density (of matter), which 
may logically be regarded as nothing at all. Simply put, the 
‘Big- Bang’ Theory proclaims creation of the world ex nihilo! 
The ‘Big-Bang’, if true, affirms that space is an entity created in 
time. But what about time itself? According to the Theory of 
Relativity, space and time form a single, complex matrix 
referred to as ‘space-time’ which is inseparable. Hence, 
according to Physicists, if space was created, then so was time! 
Another confirmation of the truth of al-Ghazali’s position vis-a- 
vis the Philosophers is afforded by the so called Second Law of 
Thermodynamics. This law claims that the entire universe and 
its processes  will ‘run down’ and reach a state of equilibrium. 
In other words, all of the energy contained within it will 
become completely evenly distributed, resulting in the world’s 
death. But if, as the Philosophers claim, the universe is eternal, 
why has it not yet reached its state of maximum entropy and 
died? After all, it had all eternity to do so!     
In subsequent chapters of the Tahafut, al-Ghazali continues to 
challenge the doctrine of the Philosophers on the world’s pre-
eternity from the aspect of causality.32 Their doctrines may also 
be refuted by purely logical investigations into the nature of 
infinity. To have pursued these themes here, however, would 
have exceeded the bounds of this thesis. 
We affirm with al-Ghazali our belief in “a Creator of the 
universe who exists changelessly and independently prior to 
                                                 
31 William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument. London: the Macmillan Press, Ltd, 1999), 116  
32 a good treatment of this is provided by Fakhry 
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creation”33 and Who continues in existence subsequent to 
creation of the world and time.  
We conclude by saying: Al- hamdu lillahi, rabbil ‘alamin.    
 
    
                 END 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
                                                 
33  Ibid 
 51
   BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
1. al-Ghazali.Tahafut al Falasifa. Translated by S.A. Kamali.     
Lahore: The Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1958.  
2. al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. The Incoherence of the 
Philosophers. A parallel English-Arabic text. Translated by 
M.E. Marmura. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 
1997. 
3.  Bello, Iysa A. The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between 
Philosophy and Orthodoxy. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1989. 
4.  Craig, W.L. The Kalam Cosmological Argument.The 
Macmillan Press. Ltd., 1979. 
5.  Fakhry, M. Islamic Occasionalism, London: Geoge Allen 
and Unwin Ltd, 1958. 
6.Goodman, L.E.  Ghazali’s Argument from Creation. 
International Journal for  Middle East Studies 2, 76, 83. 1971. 
7.  Hourani, G.F. The Dialogue Between al-Ghazali and the 
Philosophers on the Origin of the World. The Muslim World, 
Volume 48, No.3, 183-191. July, 1958. 
8.  Lane, E. W. An Arabic-English Lexicon, vol. 1 and vol. 2,       
Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2003. 
9.  Marmura, M. E. The Logical Role of the Argument from 
Time in the Tahafut’s Second Proof for the World’s Pre-
eternity. The Muslim World, Vol. 49, 306-314. 1959. 
10. Marmura, M.E. Ghazali’s Attitude to the Secular Sciences 
and Logic. Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. by 
G.F. Hourani, Albany: State University of New York Press, 
100-111. 1957 
11. Mawdudi, S.A.A., Towards Understanding the Qur’an. 
Translated by Z. I. Ansari. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 
2006   
12. Sheik, M, Saeed. Studies in Muslim Philosophy, Lahore, 
Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1969  
13. Watt,W.M. The Faith and Practice of al- Ghazali, London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1967. 
 13. Wehr, Hans. A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. 
Ithaca: New York Press, 1960. 
 
 
                       
 52
 
         
 
                                          
 
            
 
 
 
        
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
      APPENDIX                               
 
 
 
 
                                            
        
 
             
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
                    
     
 53
 
     
 
                               
 
 
  



























